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In 198 1 South Korea was the world’s fourth largest debtor country and in the 
midst of an economic crisis. It had accumulated $17.6 billion of debt within 
three years, raising its debt stock to $32.4 billion  and its debt/GDP ratio to 
49  percent.  Output  had  declined  by  4.8 percent  in  1980,  compared  to 
average growth rates in excess of  9 percent  during  1970-79.  Inflation  had 
doubled from  14.4 percent  in  1978 to 28.7 percent in  1980.’ 
Korea’s adjustment to the 1979-82  debt crisis has been remarkable. Some 
of  the key elements in the adjustment are shown in table  1.  I. By  1986 it had 
substantially  reduced the debt burden.  Inflation had fallen to just 3 percent, 
while the government budget deficit had been  cut in half.  Exports grew by 
26.6 percent, fueling a 12.5 percent increase in output and a current account 
surplus  (4.9 percent  of  GNP).  At  the  same  time,  real  wages,  per  capita 
income,  and  consumption  all  increased,  and  the  country  maintained 
historically high levels of fixed capital formation. 
In stark contrast, the World Bank’s World Development Report (1986, 54) 
describes the  plight  of  seventeen of  the  middle-income  debtor countries  as 
follows: 
The bulk  of  the adjustment has been  undertaken  through lower demand, 
which  has  meant,  in  practice,  reducing  imports  and  investment.  The 
volume  of  imports for  the  heavily  indebted  middle  income  countries  in 
1985 was 32 percent below its 1981 level. The ratio of investment to GDP 
fell  from 25  percent  in  1981  to  18  percent  in  1985. GDP has stagnated 
since  1980,  and  per  capita  incomes  have  declined  substantially.  The 
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Table 1.1  Korea’s Economic Reeoverv 
A:  Average Growth Rates  1970-79  1980-82  1983-85  1986 
GNP growth  9.5  2.3  8.5  12.5 
Consumer prices  14.9  18.8  2.7  2.3 
B:  External Indicators (selected years)  1978  1980  1982  1985  1986 
Debt  (billions U.S. $) 
DebVGNP 
Current accounVGNP 
14.8  27.2  37.1  46.8  44.5 
28.5  45.0  53.5  56.3  46.8 
-  3.0  -9.6  -4.5  -  1.8  4.9 
reduction  in  demand  has  pushed  the  collective  trade  balance  of  these 
countries into a large surplus, which has brought their current account into 
rough balance. Yet  the main indicators of  debt at  the end of  1985 were 
close  to  their  previous  peaks.  Despite  their  adjustment  efforts,  these 
countries seem to be as far as they ever were from reconciling growth and 
creditworthiness. 
Thus, it is not surprising that Korea’s experience has been labeled “a case 
of  successful adjustment”  (Aghevli and  Marquez-Ruarte  1985) raising  a 
number of  important and provocative questions. What were the  secrets of 
Korea’s  performance?  How  important  were  economic  structure,  policy 
choices, social and political factors, and external developments? Are there 
lessons to be learned which could help other debtor countries to achieve a 
more favorable balance between growth and external adjustment? 
This  study  analyzes  Korea’s  macroeconomic performance,  policy,  and 
prospects so as to provide answers to these questions. Particular emphasis is 
given to the role of external debt in contributing to the crises as well as to the 
recoveries. 
Korea’s position in the limelight is not new. The remarkable transforma- 
tion  from a war-devastated economic “basket  case”  heavily  dependent on 
foreign aid in the 1950s to a newly industrialized “economic miracle”  with 
impressive  growth  rates  during  the  1970s  has  been  well  documented.2 
Clearly, this historical development is linked to Korea’s ability to adjust to 
the recent  crisis so rapidly. We  pay  close attention to  the implications of 
Korea’s structural development in  putting together the pieces to explain the 
1980s performance. 
Korea has also received international attention due to labor unrest and to 
opposition to the slow progress toward a democratic political process. While 
an  in-depth  analysis  of  the  interactions  between  politics  and  economic 
performance is beyond  the scope of  this  study, we  recognize that political 
and  social  factors  are  integral  forces  in  the  process  of  economic 
development. Thus we have attempted to integrate some of these factors into 
our discussion in places where we found them to be especially relevant. For 
example, the sociopolitical environment seems to have had an influence over 155  KoredChapter 1 
wage  determination, over  the  extent to  which  announced economic plans 
have  been  viewed  as  credible,  and  over  the  enforceability  of  economic 
policy. 
The purpose of  this chapter is to provide an overview of the key elements 
of  Korea’s experience so as to set the stage for the remaining chapters. It is 
composed  of  two  sections.  The  first  section  briefly  reviews  Korea’s 
macroeconomic performance, identifying the central issues to be analyzed. 
The second section outlines the rest of the chapters in the study. 
1.1  Overview of  Macroeconomic Experience 
Korea’s macroeconomic history can be divided roughly into five periods. 
The early period, from 1945 to 1953, was one of continued disruption. First 
came the division into North and South Korea at the 38th parallel after World 
War  11.  The  South  was  left  with  rich  agricultural  lands  and  light 
manufacturing industries, but almost no heavy industry or power facilities. 
Attempts to begin economic recovery were interrupted by  the devastation of 
the Korean War which is estimated to have killed over one million people 
and destroyed over one-third of  South Korea’s physical capital. 
Another  development during  this  period,  with  lasting  implications  for 
Korean development, was a major land reform. During 1947-49,  farmland 
previously  owned  by  Japanese landlords was  either  redistributed or  sold, 
dramatically decreasing the concentration of land ownership. This is perhaps 
the most important factor in explaining the relatively egalitarian distribution 
of income in Korea. 
The  second  period  (1953-60)  was  one  of  slow  recovery  financed  by 
massive foreign aid, primarily from the United States.  Foreign aid inflows 
averaged nearly U.S.  $300 million per annum during 1955-59,  reaching 16 
percent of GNP in  1957. Inflation rates jumped to 60 percent immediately 
following  the  war,  while  output  growth  remained  moderate.  Under  the 
complex  system  of  trade  restrictions  erected  by  the  Syngman  Rhee 
dictatorship, exports grew by  only 1.3 percent per year. 
In  contrast,  the third  period,  from  1960-73,  saw a dramatic economic 
turnaround fueled by rapid rates of  export growth. Exports grew by 40-50 
percent  per  year  during  1960-73,  while  output  grew  by  more  than  10 
percent during 1965-73. 
The economic transition coincided with a change in political regime and 
economic policy. Syngman Rhee was forced to resign in 1960 after a student 
uprising. The new government, led by Chang Myon, collapsed in May  1961 
following a military coup led by  General Park Chung Hee,  who remained 
president of  Korea until a second coup in  1979. 
Under General Park, Korea switched from an import-substitution strategy 
to  an  active export-promotion  strategy. The  first  of  a  series  of  five-year 
plans, initiated in  1962, identified investment and economic growth as the 156  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
number  one  priorities.  Other  hallmarks  of  the  strategy  were  extensive 
government  intervention  in domestic and  international  capital markets, the 
development  of  close  links  between  government  and  industry,  import 
liberalization,  and  the  more  active  use  of  exchange  rates  to  maintain 
competitiveness. 
Foreign aid inflows fell dramatically  during the period.  During  1960-64, 
they  averaged  $210 million  per  year,  over  ten  times  the  average  annual 
accumulation of external debt. This inflow dropped to $1 10 million per year 
during 1965-69,  just one-third of  the average annual debt accumulation, and 
to  only $28 million per year during 1970-74,  or 0.03 percent  of  the debt 
accumulation.  Foreign aid to Korea had essentially ended by  1975. 
Gross fixed investment was raised from 15 percent of GNP in 1965 to 26 
percent in 1969. To  finance the investment, declining foreign aid flows were 
replaced  by  increased  reliance  on  external  borrowing  and  by  increased 
domestic saving. Firms (especially exporters) were given strong incentives to 
borrow abroad. A system of  loan guarantees substantially reduced the risks. 
Furthermore, the real  cost of  borrowing  abroad (in won)  turned  negative. 
External debt jumped to 27 percent of GNP by  1969. 
Difficulties  emerged  during  1970-72.  As  growth  slowed,  domestic 
savings dropped, increasing the current account deficit and reducing Korea’s 
debt  service  ability.  A  devaluation  to  stimulate  exports  exacerbated 
repayment difficulties for externally  indebted firms. The government bailed 
them  out  and  continued  to  pursue  its  investment  strategy.  Further 
depreciation  was combined with some monetary  and fiscal restraint. Taking 
advantage  of  strong  world  demand, exports grew  by  90  percent  in  1973. 
Output growth rose to a record  16 percent, stimulating a spurt in domestic 
saving and pulling Korea out of the first period of debt difficulties. 
The  fourth  period  (1973-78)  included  a  second  period  of  rapid  debt 
accumulation, economic difficulty,  and  recovery.  It  also coincided  with  a 
major shift in economic strategy-a  renewed industrialization,  coupled with 
increased government intervention. 
The  “Big  Push”  was  a  massive  investment  program  in  heavy  and 
chemical industries initiated in  1973 both because  policymakers  feared that 
Korea’s  comparative advantage was shifting  away  from light  industry  and 
because they wished to strengthen Korea’s defense capabilities. The program 
coincided with a resurgence in inflation, a slowdown in export growth, a rise 
in the incremental capital output ratio, and a deterioration  in the distribution 
of  income.  Import  restrictions  and  credit  rationing  increased,  and  the 
exchange rate  was  fixed  (1975-79)  and  allowed to appreciate. Although 
widely  viewed  as a policy  mistake, some of  the investments (e.g., autos) 
have begun to pay off. 
Economic growth slowed during 1974-75  in the aftermath of the oil and 
commodity  price  rise.  Again,  there  was  a  drop  in  domestic  savings, 
increasing  the  borrowing  necessary  to  finance  the  investment  program. 157  KoreaiChapter 1 
Korea elected to “borrow its way”  through the crisis so as to fulfill planned 
investment  and  to relax  monetary  and  fiscal  policies.  As  world  demand 
recovered  during  1976-78,  high  growth  rates  resumed,  raising  domestic 
savings and improving the debt position. 
In 1979 Korea underwent another shift in economic strategy. Motivated by 
concern  over rising  inflation  rates  and  economic  distortions  from  the  Big 
Push, the new  stabilization plan included monetary and fiscal restraint plus 
the  gradual  reduction  of  price  controls,  import restrictions,  and  financial 
market interventions. 
However, 1979-82  were years of crisis for Korea. The 1979 assassination 
of  President  Park  together  with  a  disastrous  agricultural  harvest  and  the 
second oil shock all contributed to a severe economic and political  crisis in 
1980. The military  assumed effective  control  of  the country  in  May  1980 
under  General  Chun  Doo  Hwan.  Chun  formally  assumed  power  in 
September,  promulgated  a  new  constitution  in  November,  and  became 
president  in  March  1981 when  his  Democratic  Justice  Party  (DJP)  won  a 
majority of seats in the new National Assembly. Chun was succeeded by Roh 
Tae Woo after the DJP won the December  1987 presidential election. 
The poor  performance  in  1979-82  is documented  in  table  1.1. Output 
stagnated,  actually  declining  (- 4.8  percent)  during  1980.  As  domestic 
savings  plunged,  the  current  account  deficit  mushroomed,  financed  by 
massive  external  borrowing.  Korea  accumulated  over  $22  billion  of  debt 
during  1979-82,  raising its debt stock to 53.5 percent  of GNP. Unlike the 
earlier episodes, the 1979-82  period was an economic crisis, comparable to 
the crises experienced in many other large debtor countries after the second 
oil price rise. 
During  1980-81  the exchange rate  was devalued, while the position  of 
monetary and fiscal policies alternated. Korea continued to borrow heavily to 
maintain  investment.  By  1982 growth  was  still  low  by  Korean  standards 
(5-6  percent)  and  exports stagnated,  but  inflation  and  the current  account 
deficits had fallen significantly. The government initiated a more expansion- 
ary policy to stimulate growth. 
As  world  demand  recovered  and  the  terms  of  trade  improved  during 
1983-84,  Korea again underwent a remarkable economic recovery.  Growth 
rates spurted. Savings rose reducing the current account deficit.  Authorities 
responded  to  the  1985  slowdown  in  export  growth  as  world  demand 
stagnated  with  a 6 percent  real  depreciation  and  a further 15  percent  real 
depreciation in  1986. 
By  1986 the  economy  was  booming,  inflationary  difficulties  had  been 
resolved, and there was a substantial trade surplus. In contrast to many of the 
other large Third World debtor countries currently negotiating rescheduling 
arrangements  with  their  creditors,  Korea  not  only  met  all  debt  service 
obligations,  but  began  to  repay  the  principal,  reducing  its  debt  stock  by 
nearly 5 percent. 158  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
1.2  Overview of the Chapters 
Four questions emerge from our summary: 
1.  What caused Korea’s debt crises? 
2.  How was Korea able to achieve rapid, successful recoveries? 
3.  What role has external borrowing played in Korean development? 
4.  What are the lessons for other debtor countries? 
Answering these questions involves examining and synthesizing a number of 
interrelated  factors.  We  focus on the  individual  factors in the body  of  our 
study, bringing them together to address the four questions above in the final 
chapter. 
The  study  is  composed  of  three  parts.  The  first  part,  chapters  2-5, 
provides a detailed discussion of Korea’s macroeconomic experience and the 
role  of  external  debt.  The historical  background  given  in  chapter 2  is  a 
review of the experience prior to 1962 which set the stage for the impressive 
economic developments during the  1960s. 
Chapter 3 gives an overview of external debt, presenting a variety of debt 
statistics.  It  highlights  the  fact  that  external  debt  has  gone  primarily  to 
finance current account deficits and not capital flight. The point is important 
because it focuses attention on the domestic counterpart to current  account 
imbalance-an  excess of domestic investment over savings. It also discusses 
the process of borrowing in Korea. 
Chapter 4 examines the three periods of rapid debt accumulation in detail. 
It reviews the economic and political developments during each cycle of debt 
accumulation,  difficulty,  and  recovery,  discussing  the  roles  of  policy  and 
external shocks. Chapter 5 provides a further analysis of the current account 
deficits which  triggered the heavy external borrowing  during 1974-77  and 
1979-82.  Using  both  accounting  decompositions  and  simulations  from  a 
macroeconomic  model  for Korea,  it  examines the  importance of  external 
shocks in the current account deteriorations. 
The chronological analysis in part  1 identifies a number of key factors in 
the experience to be examined  individually in the second part of the study 
(chap. 6-  12). After a brief introduction in chapter 6, we examine economic 
growth  in  chapter  7. Chapter  8 analyzes  saving behavior  and  the  role  of 
investment and Korea’s five-year plans. Exchange rate, trade, and industrial 
policy are studied in chapter 9, while in chapter 10 we discuss the important 
linkages  between  wages,  productivity,  and  international  competitiveness. 
Chapter  1 I  examines monetary and fiscal policy,  and income distribution is 
discussed in chapter  12. Finally,  we provide  a synthesis of  these pieces  in 
part 3 (chap.  13) and discuss the lessons from Korea’s experience. 